Is Now the Time for Major Federal Sentencing Reform? by Beale, Sara Sun
Federal  Sentencing  reporter  •  Vol .  24 ,  no.  5  •  june  2012382
Federal Sentencing Reporter, Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 382–386, ISSN 1053-9867 electronic ISSN 1533-8363.
©2012 Vera Institute of Justice. All rights reserved. Please direct requests for permission to photocopy  
or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, 
http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/fsr.2012.24.5.382.
Is Now the Time for Major Federal Sentencing Reform?
SaRa SuN 
Beale
charles l.B. 
lowndes professor, 
duke law School
Testimony before to Congress in November 2011 and at 
the Sentencing Commission’s February 2012 hearing on 
Federal Sentencing Options after Booker presented two 
sharply contrasting views.
In Congressional testimony in November of 2011, 
the Commission’s chair, Judge Patti Saris, advocated 
legislative changes to (1) require district courts to give 
“substantial weight” to the Guidelines, (2) require greater 
justifications for greater variances, (3) apply a more robust 
standard for appellate review, and (4) apply a heightened 
standard for review of sentencing decisions based upon 
policy disagreements with the Guidelines.1 Several wit-
nesses at the Commission’s follow-up hearing, including 
Judge (and former Commissioner) William Sessions2 and 
Professor Frank Bowman,3 also called for significant 
changes in the Guidelines system. Indeed, the structure of 
the Commission’s hearing—which included a panel on 
Restoring Mandatory Guidelines4—signaled its interest in 
such changes. The need for a “Booker fix” rests predomi-
nantly (though not exclusively) on the perception of what 
Judge Saris characterized as “troubling trends in sentenc-
ing,” meaning declining rates of within-Guidelines 
sentences and the perception that unwarranted disparity 
is increasing.
In contrast, however, many other witnesses (myself 
included) testified that the system is working reasonably 
well, and they opposed any fundamental legislative 
changes, particularly those intended to make the system 
more binding or mandatory.5 Some of the witnesses who 
supported the current advisory Guidelines system urged 
other changes, particularly the elimination of mandatory 
minimum sentences and reductions in sentencing 
severity.6
In this brief essay, I explain my view that the Commis-
sion’s data do not show a “troubling” level of variances 
and provide no justification for significant legislation 
changes to reduce judicial discretion and make the federal 
Guidelines more binding or mandatory.
I. First Principles
Proponents of change bear the burden of persuasion. That 
is true as a general matter, and much more so in the case 
of such a large and complex system.
Section 3553(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act is the 
benchmark for evaluating the current sentencing statis-
tics. It begins with a key admonition that courts “shall 
impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than nec-
essary” to comply with the statutory purposes of 
sentencing.7 This parsimony principle is more, not less, 
important in 2012 than it was at the time of its enactment 
in 1984, because of two well-known factors: the very sub-
stantial increase in the size of the federal prison 
population, and the pressing need to reduce the federal 
budget deficit.
This is not merely a matter of our concern for the indi-
viduals who might serve a term of imprisonment 
exceeding what the statute requires. In their testimony 
both Associate Deputy Attorney General Matthew Axelrod8 
and Professor Frank Bowman9 rightly called attention to 
tradeoffs within the criminal justice budget: dollars spent 
on the Bureau of Prisons are not available for the investiga-
tion and enforcement of new criminal activity. Public 
safety is and should remain a concern, and excessive use of 
incarceration does not promote public safety.
II. What does unwarranted disparity mean?
In considering whether changes are necessary to respond 
to increasing disparity in the federal system in the wake of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,10 
it is important to consider together two elements of the 
statutory directive in § 3553(a).
• Subsection 3553(a)(6) provides that in imposing 
sentences the courts shall consider “the need to 
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar conduct.”
• However, that provision cannot be considered in 
isolation. Indeed, Section 3553(a) begins with the 
admonition in subsection (1) that the court “shall 
consider . . . the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant.”
Read together these provisions demonstrate that a dif-
ference in the sentence for two individuals is not an 
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These cases illustrate how critical it is not to equate all 
sentences below the Guidelines range with unwarranted 
and “troubling” disparity. Below-Guidelines sentences 
may be fully in accordance with both the mandate of the 
parsimony principle as well as the statutory requirement 
that the district courts consider the offender’s characteris-
tics. Advocates of changes that would make the federal 
system more binding, moving it closer to a mandatory sys-
tem, typically emphasize the increasing percentage of 
below-Guidelines sentences not sponsored by the Govern-
ment. This argument assumes that these variances and 
departures are unwarranted in some, most, or all of the 
individual cases.14 That assumption, however, is not con-
sistent with the statutory directives.
One of the changes proposed by Judge Saris on behalf 
of the Commission would work an important, and unde-
sirable, change on this very point. In her Congressional 
testimony in October 2011, Judge Saris suggested that the 
language of § 3553(a)(1) should be modified to eliminate 
the reference to offender characteristics in the sentencing 
of individual defendants.15 Gall, Pepper, and many other 
cases demonstrate the importance of consideration of 
offender characteristics in individual cases.
B.  Sentencing Discretion and Differences  
in Prosecutorial Charging and Bargaining
The additional flexibility provided to the district courts as a 
result of the Booker decision also provided these courts 
with an enhanced ability to achieve greater consistency 
(rather than disparity) by offsetting variances in prosecuto-
rial practices.16
The Commission’s data have consistently shown sig-
nificant differences from district to district, which were 
present both before and after the Booker decision. As Pro-
fessor Michael Tonry noted in his prepared testimony, 
sentencing regimes in the U.S. (as elsewhere) will exhibit 
natural regional variations.17 What Professor Tonry did not 
emphasize is how much of the variation from district to 
district has been and continues to be the result of differ-
ences in the policies and practices of the U.S. Attorney’s 
Offices, particularly with regard to the prevalence and 
standards for downward departures for substantial assis-
tance. In 2010, the rate of government-sponsored 
downward departures for substantial assistance in six pro-
filed districts ranged from a low of 2.8 percent to a high of 
32 percent.18 Equally important, this variation in prosecu-
torial practices existed both before and after Booker, with 
the same districts having very low or high rates of substan-
tial assistance departures.19
Additionally, the Commission’s mandatory minimum 
studies have revealed long-standing practices that may cre-
ate disparity. The Commission’s 2011 report to Congress 
on mandatory minimums documented that inconsistent 
charging and plea practices among districts resulted in the 
disparate application of mandatory minimum sentencing 
provisions.20 Similarly, in 1995, the Commission found 
that less than half of defendants eligible for mandatory 
unjustified disparity if it reflects a difference in the circum-
stances of the offense, the criminal history of the 
defendants, or “the characteristics of the defendant.”
a.  Individual characteristics may warrant different 
sentences.
Two recent cases in the United States Supreme Court, 
Gall v. United States11 and Pepper v. United States,12 illus-
trate that not all differences in sentences are unjustified.
As a college student, Brian Gall was using drugs when 
he joined an ongoing drug conspiracy and delivered 
ecstasy pills. Within months, however, he stopped using 
drugs, voluntarily withdrew from the conspiracy, gradu-
ated from college, and obtained work in the construction 
industry, eventually becoming a master carpenter. When 
federal investigators later approached him, he admitted 
his limited participation. After release on his own recogni-
zance, Gall started a construction business netting profits 
of more than $2,000 per month. Applying the § 3553(a) 
factors and noting that Gall had withdrawn from the con-
spiracy, had used no drugs since college, and was 
“self-rehabilitated,” the district judge sentenced Gall to 
probation. In considering these factors, the district judge 
did not create an unwarranted disparity between Gall and 
other offenders. To the contrary, the disparity was war-
ranted. In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court held that 
“[o]n abuse-of-discretion review, the Court of Appeals 
should have given due deference to the District Court’s 
reasoned and reasonable decision that the § 3553(a) factors, 
on the whole, justified the sentence.”13
In the Supreme Court, Jason Pepper’s case involved 
the issue, not relevant here, of the propriety of consider-
ing post-rehabilitative resentencing. For my purposes, 
the main point is how much Jason Pepper, like Brian 
Gall, differed from most offenders sentenced for similar 
offenses. By the time of his resentencing on drug 
charges, Pepper was no longer a drug addict, was 
enrolled in community college, had achieved very good 
grades, was working part time, and was slated for a pro-
motion. He was married and supporting a family, and 
had also reestablished relationships with his father. His 
probation officer testified that in light of his substantial 
assistance and rehabilitation, Pepper posed a very low 
risk of reoffending. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) the sen-
tencing court was not merely permitted, but required to 
consider these factors. Given Pepper’s characteristics 
and the statutory directive to impose a sentence not 
greater than necessary to satisfy the statutory purposes 
of sentencing, it was entirely appropriate for the district 
court to sentence him very substantially below the Guide-
lines range. Thus the difference between Pepper’s 
sentence and that of other defendants whose conduct 
involved the same quantity of drugs is not an unjustified 
disparity. Indeed, it would be counterproductive to 
require that he be imprisoned for as long as another 
offender who had neither conquered his addiction nor 
demonstrated such exemplary rehabilitation.
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for regional variations. Sentences within certain districts or 
regions may reflect distinctive local conditions, including 
prevalence of certain crimes, the charging practices of the 
U.S. Attorneys, the federal caseload, and the availability of 
state prosecutions.26 Such disparity is not unwarranted. 
And we should also be wary of any cure that may be worse 
than the disease. In this context, what critics call “disparity” 
generally means an uneven distribution of sentences that 
are below (not above) the applicable Guidelines range. 
Unwarranted severity can produce sentencing disparity.27 
I argue below that excessive sentence severity is a problem, 
but not one that Congress is likely to solve, at least in the 
near term. If I am right, reducing so-called disparity in this 
context will mean increasing unwarranted severity.
III. assessing Other Justifications for Change
The hardest question to answer is how to assess the pro-
posals for fundamental change ably championed by Judge 
Sessions,28 Professor Frank Bowman,29and the Constitu-
tion Project.30
To say that the current system is working fairly well is 
not to say that it is ideal. I agree that we could in theory 
have a much better—or even an ideal—system. My wish 
list for a new or improved sentencing regime would 
include:
• recalibration to lower sentences, because the pres-
ent system generates unnecessarily severe 
sentences that impose great costs on society as well 
as individual offenders, their families, and commu-
nities;
• simplification, because the present system is 
unduly complex, making it more costly and more 
prone to error;
• enhanced reliability of fact-finding on key factual 
issues;
• preservation of judicial flexibility, which might 
include but would not be limited to broader sen-
tencing ranges;
• insulation from Congressional micro-management; 
and 
• correction of structural problems, such as the fact 
that the Sentencing Commission is not subject to 
the rule-making procedures and appellate review 
under the Administrative Procedure Act.31
The question, however, is not whether one can imagine a 
better system, but whether now is the time to initiate the 
process for fundamental change and redesign of the fed-
eral sentencing system.
There is no present agreement on the key goals or ele-
ments of change. As noted, some advocates of change seek 
a system that is mandatory (or as close to mandatory as 
constitutionally possible without jury findings). Others, 
however, have very different goals, giving a high priority to 
bringing sentencing levels down, simplifying the system, 
and preserving judicial flexibility.
sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) were sentenced 
under that provision. No charges under § 924(c) were ever 
filed in a significant number of eligible cases, and in many 
other cases the § 924(c) charges were bargained away in 
plea negotiations.21
A new working paper describing a study by Professors 
Sonja Starr and Marit Rehavi highlights how critical it 
may be to study the effect of charging decisions and to 
maintain judicial flexibility.22 Their working paper reports 
their conclusion that black arrestees, especially black 
males, face significantly more severe charges conditional 
on the offense for which they are arrested and other 
observed characteristics. They find that the disparity in the 
use of charges that carry mandatory minimum sentences 
is “particularly striking,” and disparities arising from 
charging decisions “appear to be major drivers of sentenc-
ing disparity.”23 Accordingly, they suggest that “if 
policymakers are serious about reducing racial disparity in 
sentencing, a substantial portion of their focus should be 
on the role of prosecutorial discretion, including the appli-
cation of mandatory minimum sentences.”24 Although 
this is merely a working paper, it shows the potential 
impact of charging decisions, as well as the wisdom of 
preserving judicial flexibility.
Prosecutorial charging decisions are not made trans-
parently and are not subject to judicial review. It seems 
unwise to focus on reducing judicial discretion—but not 
disparities in prosecutorial practices—when doing so may 
deprive the courts of a tool to respond to prosecutorial 
practices and promote true sentencing uniformity.
C. Conclusions about Disparity
These general observations lead me to two conclusions. 
First, the data do not show unwarranted sentencing dispar-
ity (though there are significant problems with a few 
particular Guidelines, some of which are under review by 
the Commission). In my view, these data are not sufficient 
to meet the burden of demonstrating the need for funda-
mental change. Although the system that has evolved 
since Booker is not perfect, the district courts now have the 
flexibility to respond in individual cases to excessively (or 
insufficiently) severe sentences that do not serve the statu-
tory purposes of sentencing. Second, it is unclear whether 
any of the proposed changes would achieve the goal of 
reducing unwarranted disparity. Reducing downward 
departures and variances might actually increase true dis-
parity by eliminating judicial flexibility to take into 
account critical offender characteristics and to offset dif-
ferences in prosecutorial practices and policies.
What if the Commission or other groups produce more 
refined data showing increases in regional and inter-judge 
disparity?25 What should we do if judges in some regions, 
or individual judges on some courts, are consistently more 
willing than others to sentence below the Guidelines when 
there are factors that might support such a sentence under 
§ 3553(a)? In considering whether statutory changes are war-
ranted, we should recognize that there may be good reasons 
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and_public_affairs/public_Hearings_and_Meet-
ings/20120215-16/testimony_16_pag.pdf  (concluding “the 
system is working well” and opposing changes in appellate 
review and greater justification for greater variances); james 
e. Felman, testimony on Behalf  of  the american Bar associa-
tion before the u.S. Sentencing commission, February 16, 
2012, 24 Fed.  S ent’g R ep .  369 (2012) (concluding that the 
advisory guidelines system best achieves the goals of  the 
Sentencing reform act and opposing mandatory guidelines); 
Statement of  chief  united States circuit judge theodore 
McKee, court of  appeals for the third circuit, on Behalf  of  
the judicial conference of  the united States committee on 
criminal law, available at http://www.ussc.gov/legislative_
and_public_affairs/public_Hearings_and_Meet-
ings/20120215-16/testimony_16_McKee.pdf  (concluding 
that “the current advisory system is fair, workable, transpar-
ent, predictable, and flexible,” and finding “no need for major 
sentencing reform”); Statement of  Michael nachmanoff, Fed-
eral public defender for the eastern district of  Virginia, 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/legislative_and_public_
affairs/public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215-16/
testimony_16_nachmanoff.pdf  (concluding that “no Booker 
fix is necessary” and opposing mandatory guidelines”); State-
ment of  Mary price, Vice president and general counsel, 
FaMM, available at http://www.ussc.gov/legislative_and_pub-
lic_affairs/public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215-16/
testimony_16_FaMM.pdf  (concluding that proposals to make 
the guidelines mandatory or more binding rest on “flawed 
premises, missing information, unduly rigid interpretations of  
the role of  the guidelines in sentencing, and the failure to rec-
ognize—or at least help congress recognize—the difference 
between disparity that is warranted and that which is not”); 
Written Statement of  lisa Wayne, president, on Behalf  of  the 
national association of  criminal defense lawyers, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/legislative_and_public_affairs/public_
Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215-16/testimony_16_
nacdl_Wayne.pdf  (supporting the advisory guidelines 
system and opposing the commission’s proposals).
 6 See, e.g., Statement of  Honorable judge andre M. davis, 
united States circuit judge, united States court of  appeals 
for the Fourth circuit 1–3, available at http://www.ussc.gov/
legislative_and_public_affairs/public_Hearings_and_Meet-
ings/20120215-16/testimony_16_davis.pdf  (criticizing 
effect of  mandatory minimum sentencing statutes; calling on 
congress to reassess the severity, scope, and structure of  
recidivist provisions; and supporting expansion of  the safety 
valve provisions); and Felman, supra note 5, at 369–70, 371 
(describing the problem of  excessive reliance on incarcera-
tion and sentencing severity, and opposing mandatory 
minimum sentences).
 7 18 u.S.c. § 3553(a).
 8 Matthew axelrod, testimony on Behalf  of  the u.S. depart-
ment of  justice before the u.S. Sentencing commission, 
February 16, 2012, 24 Fed. S ent’g R ep .  348, 348–49 (2012). 
 9 Statement of  professor Frank o. Bowman, supra note 3, 
at 19.
 10 543 u.S. 220 (2005).
 11 552 u.S. 38 (2007).
 12 131 S.ct. 1229 (2011).
 13 552 u.S. at 59–60.
 14 the real question is what offender characteristics are relevant 
to sentencing. not all are. even members of  the Supreme 
court who disagree on other issues agree that giving harsher 
sentences to red Sox fans than to Yankees fans would be 
improper and warrant reversal on appeal. justice Stevens 
stated that “a district judge who gives harsh sentences to 
Yankee fans and lenient sentences to red Sox fans would not 
be acting reasonably even if  her procedural rulings were 
The choice among those alternatives would not be 
made by the Sentencing Commission and the witnesses 
who testified before it, or by the specialists who read the 
Federal Sentencing Reporter. Any changes of this nature 
would necessarily require Congressional action.
Congress is—and is intended to be—a political, non-
expert, lay body. It does not approach sentencing from the 
perspective of those who work in the system day to day, 
seeing the individual cases like Gall and Pepper, nor from 
an academic perspective. Its views of needed and desirable 
change in the past twenty years have focused on two ele-
ments: harsher sentences and less judicial discretion.32 
These themes have been popular with the public.
What basis do we have for thinking this dynamic will 
change? Why should we think that the views of the Commis-
sion or experts will be more persuasive in Congress now?
Two time-worn adages contain wisdom that seems very 
much on point here. The first is the old trial lawyers’ 
adage that you should never ask a witness a question if 
you don’t already know the answer. There’s a rough paral-
lel here. We should not ask Congress for fundamental 
reform of the sentencing process if we don’t know what 
answer it might give to the question how the system 
should change. The second adage is often attributed to 
Voltaire: the perfect is the enemy of the good. The wit-
nesses who cautioned the Sentencing Commission 
against change have concluded that the present system, 
though far from perfect, is pretty good. That is especially 
so when contrasted with a system that combines inflexibil-
ity with excessive severity.
I agree.
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